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One may misread economic theory on climate policy to provide a warning against unilateral 
mitigation. While important lessons are drawn from ‘global problems require global solutions’, these 
say little about what to do in a phase before or without a global agreement - or with weak ones. In the 
literature on cooperation and leadership in provision of public goods, early provision may stimulate 
provision from others. A key to leadership is signaling; an early mover has private information and is 
motivated in part by knowing that others will follow. Others will follow if they understand that the 
early mover demonstrates that emission reductions are feasible and adoptable. Our analysis finds that 
early movers will be cognizant of what they need to demonstrate, and they will be concerned about 
and act on carbon leakage.  Leadership can be deterred by concerns for free riding, but this is more 
likely for a country or coalition that is large in terms of emissions and face others who are both large 
and vulnerable to climate change. We suggest leadership is possible early in this century: numbers 
indicate that few – if any - need find themselves deterred from early action of some sort.  
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1: Introduction and Outline 
One may accept, as the world’s countries have done, that some very significant reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions in this century is worth it to mankind. In fact, many of the world’s 
countries, through EU, through climate convention statements (the Copenhagen Accord, for 
instance), have declared goals that are very ambitious for this century, exemplified by the two 
degree goal, implying reductions of 80% in emissions by the middle of this century. How can 
it be done? The difficult part is that this requires cooperation. 
Earth is populated by about 7 billion presentliving individuals, by firms, and by about 200 
sovereign countries. In terms of consequence, earth also consists of future generations, while 
carrying the history of past ones. Costs of emission reductions, it appears, are not prohibitive, 
estimates range from zero to three percent of GDP in this century2.  
In the present paper, we understand mitigation as a global public good, meaning that the 
benefits thereof are nonrivalrous and nonexclusive. This is the basis for the brief and powerful 
statement global problems require global solutions. Nick Sterns words, in “the economics of 
climate change (2008), are: “Climate change is global in its origins and in its impacts. An 
effective response must therefore be organized globally and must involve international 
understanding and collaboration”.  
It is possible to conclude that a consequence from “global requires global” is a warning to 
countries that they should not try to fix this problem themselves. The purpose of the present 
paper is to scrutinize and set in context the foundation of such a warning. The warning is of 
course an important one but also one that can be misleading, and we shall emphasize the latter 
aspect.  
The warning against early unconditional unilateral mitigation is attractive not only because it 
is tempting not to take on mitigation costs unilaterally - of course it is. Also, a unilateral 
reduction may be partly or fully offset by a response in which other countries (or subsequent 
generations) emit more than they otherwise would if some have raised their reductions early 
and unilaterally. One such effect, termed ‘carbon leakage’ is when mitigation among some 
countries change world market prices – raise steel prices and reduce coal prices, for instance – 
so that other countries’ emissions rise through increased steel production and coal use. 
Another effect is the classical ‘free rider’ response, whereby others’ emissions increase 
because of the reduced threat of climate change or damages. Free riding occurs under 
noncooperation when there is a public good, as with mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions.  
Typically, such free riding is described by a Nash equilibrium in a one-shot game when 
players move simultaneously, often a “prisoners’ dilemma”. However, in a variation we shall 
focus on, if one player is given a chance to move reduce emissions, free riding will be 
described in the reaction – if the first mover reduces emissions others will emit more than 
                                                            
2 The Stern Review (2007), Heal (2009) and others present estimates in this range, though some include minus 
one percent.  
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they otherwise would have, and vice versa. It is in this latter setting we analyse ‘early, 
unilateral, unconditional’.  
A reaction of increased free riding cannot – of course – much deter from leadership a country 
or actions small enough not to change climate prospects. Also, such deterrence of early action 
will be limited from a country or countries small enough not to change climate prospects, or 
sufficiently disinterested not to let prospects of climate change influence its emitting activity. 
Deterrents to leadership – thus – if important at all, will be between countries or groups that 
are large and sensitive to climate change, and will be important only after some important 
early mitigation, perhaps akin to what we are seeing in a couple of early decades of this 
century. Thus, such concerns can probably be contained by ensuing talks, adding weight to 
the prospects for leadership.  
Our notion of leadership 
When actions and options arise in a sequence, this allows for a great variation in 
interpretations and models, and some of these variations qualify the warning by allowing 
some players to follow an action of early mitigation. This possibility exists also in longer 
sequences, as in so-called repeated games, perhaps akin to a situation where countries 
periodically talk, perhaps arriving at treaties, then act, talk, and so on. In infinitely repeated 
games, cooperation can be sustained among forwardlooking players through the threat from 
noncooperation in the future3.  
We use the term ‘leadership’ to bring in the possibility - indeed it is used by practitioners – 
the various possibilities that positive provision follows positive provision. We shall define 
leadership by the fact that someone chooses to follow, and that this is part of what motivates 
the leader.   
We here may think about the term follow in three common meanings:  
i) after the other, in sequence of time;  
ii) caused by the other;  
iii) with the same sign as the other. So if you start walking through the forest I head in 
the same direction after you because you did4.  
So we are asking whether emission reductions from some may be caused by and after 
emission reductions (or some action in that direction) by another. Importantly, free riding, 
while often portrayed in a simultaneous move Nash equilibrium, would in this alternative 
setting typically indicate an effect of the opposite sign – so that emission reductions rasie 
emissions from others.  
                                                            
3 That is: if they are sufficiently interested in the future. For any level of cooperation there is a discount rate 
low enough to sustain it: this type of results is known as the folk theorems of repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
games.  
4 We thereby separate ourselves from Stackelberg leadership in iii) (see below), since a Stackelberg leader 
often will cause others in the opposite direction, as when leader’s increase in output causes reductions from 
competitors.  
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It is important to realize that no notion of leadership is included or examined in the general 
warning founded on the free riding incentive in public goods provision. On the contrary, that 
warning rather says that absent any structure by which players take clues from each other and 
may follow, incentives to free ride are such that provision of public goods must be 
coordinated through a treaty5.  
Of course, the possibility for leadership exists, then early actions may indeed be motivated by 
the fact or the possibility that others are influenced (i.e. might follow). So a country or a 
group of countries that acts may consider the consequences for others’ actions, in treaty 
formation or other acts.  
Once this is realized, it also becomes clear that not only emissions, or mitigation, or 
‘quantities’, can be on the menu of ‘early actions’, indeed the menu of early actions may 
include such items as words, education, R&D expenses, arms purchases, trade or other 
treaties. Indeed, not only is a game in emitted quantities vastly changed if we acknowledge 
that ‘players’ may read something into others’ actions. Also, a game about emissions is also 
vastly changed if we allow early occurrences not only to consist of emitted quantities (this 
latter reformulation is called strategy space in game theoretic terms).  
The ‘gobal requires global’ statement certainly involves a warning from economists that 
countries should not act independently but rather act through cooperative agreements. 
However, economists are also not very optimistic about the prospects for cooperation, even 
when the cooperative enterprise is deemed productive collectively, as in this case. An obvious 
point – above - is that free riding can result from not cooperating.  
A less obvious point is that the body of literature called cooperative game theory – where 
parties (countries) may sign binding agreement, is not very optimistic about cooperation, or 
constructive in how to make it happen. In brief, when there are many potential parties (like 
three or more), agreements between many of them may fail to be signed because everyone 
feels that some other ‘nonlarge coalition’ without her can provide most of the gains from 
cooperation (in technical terms; the core of the game may be empty even in very productive 
games, i.e. even in settings where cooperation makes good sense collectively). In cooperative 
games, while cooperation may happen if all parties know that nothing will happen without all 
(an example can be if catastrophe happens unless everyone cooperates), in very important 
settings cooperation will either attract very few or support very little effort (Barrett, 1994).  
Outline of the paper  
In section 2: “Leadership in public goods provision” we draw from the economics literature 
on public goods provision, with emphasis on the few contributions – some theoretical, some 
from experimental and evolutionary settings – illuminating sequences of actions. The 
economics literature on cooperation is penetrating and ambitious, and may be read as quite 
pessimistic about cooperation. But a few studies of voluntary contributions and on 
‘leadership’ also show that the economics literature is quite agnostic about how cooperation 
                                                            
5 Hoel (1991) looks into unilateral mitigation, comparing it to a treaty that is efficient, explicitly ruling out the 
possibility that unilateral reductions by one country may lead to similar behavior by other countries.  
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comes about, and especially as a process. Indeed, when there is cooperation and public goods 
provision in experimental games, it is the extent of cooperation and provision that is puzzling 
and challenging to theorists, not the breakdown of cooperation and the reduction in provision. 
Nevertheless, this literature offers several distinct contributions by which one can see a 
‘positive following’, adding nuance to the warning that mitigation from some will raise free 
riding and emissions from others. Briefly, what leadership entails (i.e. when it causes a 
following) is a signaling to others that the cooperative venture is an attractive one, and/or that 
a common understanding of fair burdensharing is possible.  
In section 3, “Global problems require global solutions, and the planner’s problem” , we detail 
how present ‘lessons’ on mitigation really result from a planning model and are relevant only 
under assumptions of global cooperation where ‘the mitigation problem’ is solved once and 
for all. This leads into our reemphasis on what it is that happens if/when a global or great 
treaty has not been formed, or is weak, and what kind of dependence occurs when actions and 
choices follow one another? We could say, today, if some countries and regions press on with 
emission reductions despite no or very weak treaty commitments: is this plain silly, inviting 
free-riding from others, or is it possible that its effect on the emissions from others will be to 
bring them lower than what they otherwise would be, rather than higher?  
Section 4, “Pondering the the early problem in absence of a strong global treaty” tries to be 
concrete about how actions could link between countries and between periods, noting that any 
early action must be motivated by how it affects global century emissions. Thus, linkages 
from period to period, from country to country, and carbon leakage all are of interest (unless 
they can be explicitly ruled out). 
Section 5; “Supply of public goods and the free rider problem” presents analysis to the effect 
– explained above – that for many countries, early actions need not be much deterred by 
concerns for inducing increased emissions from others.  
Section 6 asks: Can a leadership perspective inform or explain early contributions. This 
discussion is informal and tentative, but since one important lesson from the review in section 
2 is that leadership involves signaling by leader and inference drawn by others, it follows that 
countries may look for each other’s motives when they look to each other’s actions. This has 
two important implications: one is that not only quantities – emissions or emission reductions 
– matter, it could also be actions with no (early) impact on emissions, such as R&D, or even 
words. Another consequence is that such actions as emission reductions will be scrutinized 
with other criteria than just the emission reductions and their costs, so the criterion of cost 
effectiveness will not rule the ground alone, or in any case it will rule in a modified fashion6.  
2: Leadership in public goods provision 
In this review section we shall find support for voluntary provision – for taking the lead. If 
one asks how public goods provision comes about, and whether leadership can play a role, 
insights on leadership can be found in pure theory as well as in experimental literature.  
                                                            
6 Since we allow for signaling, what one reads into early action can be important. We would not agree that one 
needs action rather than words. Words can matter positively, but so can other actions.  
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In our idea of leadership, we ask for a setting where  
 one player acts before others to provide a public good – early, unilaterally, 
unconditionally. 
Leadership is then much described by the fact that this instigates others to do the same (or 
something similar), and we ask: 
 what instigates this following? 
The leadership we look for will often be chosen by the player herself, in the sense that any 
one of the players could move first, but this is not necessary, and is in fact rare in the 
literature. Importantly, thinking about sovereign countries, we are not examining a situation of 
authority – like  credible threat of punishment.  
In other words, we want following to be voluntary and not due to a threat of punishment or 
reward. We do not rule out in general situations where following is assured by credible threat 
of punishment (though this is not our main interest), but we rule out those situations where 
one does not ask how those threats are credible, or sustained. Here we are in line with 
important game theoretic treatments (such as the folk theorem of repeated prisoners’ 
dilemma), which rules out cooperation if the incentives that could support it are not credible.  
Leadership is given in the outset 
We have argued above that the field of economics is pessimistic and agnostic about 
cooperation in public goods provision, and thin also on leadership in general as well as 
leadership in public goods provision in particular.  
A term established in economics textbooks is Stackelberg leadership, in which one player is 
by exogenous construct given the first move. The leader’s choices follow from her 
assumption that the other player(s) will take her actions as given. Thus, the existence of 
followers (in the sense of players which will take her choice as given) is part of what 
motivates the ‘leader’, so the slightly paradoxical fact that followers influence the leader is 
established even in this very simple structure: If a general charges ahead of her troops, she is 
motivated in part by her knowledge that her troops will follow.  
Then, important literature on organizations expands on formal authority – the right to decide - 
with questions of what it means to lead. Aghion and Tirole (1997), analyses how much 
authority to delegate to a subordinate, the tradeoff being that delegation allows subordinate 
initiative but at a loss of control for the principal. Another contribution on the tradeoffs 
involved in being a leader when subordinates have private information is Prendergast’s ‘A 
theory of “yes-men”’ (1993), in which subordinates end up ‘guessing’ or ‘mimicking’ the 
assumed choices of their leader, even though the leader wants them to apply their own 
information and judgment only, and tries to delegate. As with Stackelberg leadership, this 
literature does not speak so directly to our question, since authority to lead is given, while our 
question is on how leadership arises among evenly leveled players (like sovereigns). But a 
theme in delegation we will rediscover in the more relevant studies is that a leader contributes 
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with information but also is sensitive to information and preferences of those who may 
follow. 
Perhaps with a more direct pointer to our question is Bolton, Brunnermeier and Veldkamp 
(2008), in which there is a tradeoff between organizational learning and leader resoluteness: 
the latter is important to coordinate followers, but is restricted by time consistency given that 
new information is arriving. In their model, as in Aghion and Tirole’s, a leader will be more 
humble (delegating, listening to her subordinates) if her subordinates have valuable 
information held privately. We shall rediscover this theme below. 
Endogenous leadership based on private information 
An important theoretical contribution on leadership in provision of public goods is Hermalin, 
(1998). Hermalin assumes that followers follow because it is in their interest to do so, and 
turns the table by allowing that the leader has better information of what they – the whole 
group including herself - should do. The setting is one in which opportunities for public goods 
are more or less productive (or attractive, in more general terms), and the leader has better 
information on how productive such a cooperative opportunity is.  
In this setting, leadership is about transmitting information, duly accounting for the obvious 
challenge of transmitting credibly, so that others will choose to follow. Typically, building on 
the Holmstrom (1982) team model, there are incentives to mislead. Thus, if a leader makes a 
proclamation that a given public good provision opportunity is a very productive one, she will 
not be believed.  
Hermalin allows a player who has received private information about the productivity of the 
game to work hard herself, and followers will draw inference from her effort about the 
productivity of the game (if she is working this hard, it must be something good waiting!). An 
important result is that a leader who herself obtains a share of the joint product of the game 
has an extraordinary incentive to work hard because her effort draws  inference and thereby 
effort from followers.  
Hermalin shows that the act of leadership – the act of credibly signaling productivity in a 
public goods game – can involve  
 leading by example or  
 leading by sacrifice.  
Both of these shall be important to us in the following.  
Two illustrations: It should clear that the image of a general who charges the enemy in front 
of her troops applies both to ‘by example’ and to ‘by sacrifice’: i) the soldiers – the followers 
– likely can infer from her behavior that she believes they can win and/or is willing to make a 
sacrifice (this game is a productive one), so they follow; ii) the general’s knowledge that they 
will follow is clearly part of her motivation; iii) bringing in reputation, we may draw on Sun 
Tsu’s “The art of war”: whose teachings include: “the only battles I really won were the ones 
I did not fight”. This renowned Chinese thinker and general in this represents that he values 
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his men’s losses very highly (I only fight when I have to, and only when I can win) rendering 
his men more willing to follow him. Also: he spared enemy soldiers when he could, thereby 
enticing them to break ranks and follow. Finally, to emphasize the ‘private information’ part 
of leadership, Sun Tsu writes repeatedly about intelligence and spies, about the value of 
knowing the terrain, the weather, your enemy, his status (and exploit all of this). 
An important feature here is thus that the player becoming a leader has superior information, 
typically about the productivity of the game, and followers know or understand this. This part 
of leadership could be that a person is believed better to understand nature. So, you would 
follow a guide across the mountains because he knows them well. But, as we shall see below, 
you might also want him to know you and your condition, and perhaps even to emphasize 
with you.   
In many settings, the belief that the leader is better informed is not a mystery or a question. 
For instance, in a production enterprise, the leader in constructing a bridge is perhaps the 
engineer with an understanding of bridges and a plan for the bridge. This applies not less, of 
course, if the bridgebuilding group is individuals who need an opportunity to cross the river, 
and look for a leader within. In other setting, the leader is a person who both owns the fishing 
vessel and has the weather forecasts and fishing skills. There are reasons more than authority 
and pay to follow her orders, in fact she might be the owner because she is an excellent 
hunter, sailor, navigator.  
Leadership in an endogenous setting also brings about the possibility that the leader is well 
informed about the players: she may be ‘in touch’ or ‘know their pain’, to use Hermalin’s 
words, pointing to Weber, the sociologist. For instance, you may think about a person with 
great social skills and knowledge of her friends as one who can organize a great party because 
she knows what will make people happy and they all know she does. Such a party, with the 
positive external effects between guests arriving with high expectations, can be viewed as a 
public good. Adding a reputation effect from event to event would reduce the costs of 
signaling good cooperative opportunities, making even better cooperation – i.e. parties - 
feasible through lower costs of taking the lead.   
The idea that leadership can be built on knowing or associating well with your peers – as a 
union leader, a civic leader, or a religious leader – of course points to the possibility that 
leadership arises from the ranks – our type of question, arises between nations - and to 
motivation by other means than through monetary returns. Then, also using Hermalin’s idea 
of a leader who can ‘feel their pain’ there can be a role for concepts such as empathy and 
altruism (on norms, see below) both of which can in themselves contribute to cooperation on 
public goods provision, perhaps including through leadership.7  
                                                            
7 We do not emphasize, here, models that are political or electoral in nature, but may mention Dewan and 
Squintani (2013), as an example. They build on Machiavelli’s “The Prince” and his “you can assess a prince by 
his councelors” to construct a setting where a limited set of advisors who are close ideologically is important to 
the quality of leadership, thus alluding both to ‘feel their pain¨’ and to the value to the leader of having access 
to information that is not widely held. Rotemberg and Saloner (1993), similarly, concludes “We show that 
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There are of course important questions about whether insights from leadership models for 
individuals apply to cooperation and leadership among organizations and states. An indication 
that part of it does, however, would be if what we see in politicians’ behavior when countries 
meet and negotiate that they try to signal that they understand each other and each other’s 
domestic challenges8. 
There are many contributions warning against taking the lead in global environmental 
policies, an important one being Hoel (1991), with a common feature being no behavioral or 
other assumption linking responses in other’s emissions to actions taken by the leader. Brandt 
(2004), adds nuance and contrast to this literature by introducing an element like that in 
Hermalin’s (1998) model. Assuming that abatement costs are correlated, he finds that 
“transmission of information by use of a unilateral move makes sense”. Such correlation 
directly asks for the signaling role that a leader can take, though in Brandt’s model a country 
that takes the lead may also be the one who most optimistically misjudges the costs of 
mitigation (an effect much like winner’s curse, well known in economic theory).  
Hoel and Golombek (2008), in a later contribution, demonstrates that positive spillovers from 
R&D can eliminate the carbon leakage effect of unilateral action and in some settings create 
positive spillovers in terms of further emission reductions from others. Combining this with 
Hermalin type leadership expands the effects and thus extent of moving early: If early movers 
you not only signal feasibility or low costs, but also bring costs down, either through R&D or 
through learning by doing/scale economies. 
Cooperation on public goods provision and leadership in Evolutionary settings 
Evolutionary settings were pioneered for a quintessential problem of cooperation, Axelrod’s 
(1981) pursuits with public goods provision in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Here, a version 
of limited (or bounded) rationality is specified by a fairly short program code, and Axelrod 
showed that when behavioral rules played against each other, a very simple reciprocal 
strategy called ‘tit for tat’ performs well.  
‘Performing well’ in an evolutionary setting means that your ‘profit’ gives you or your 
offspring higher tendency to survival or procreation. The tit for tat strategy in repeated games 
is simply ‘I start by playing cooperate and thereafter play as you do (I cooperate if you 
cooperate and defect if you defect’)9. When the player with the tit-for-tat program does well, 
it is a combination of not losing too much when meeting others who do not cooperate (since 
she switches quickly to not cooperating) and doing quite well with others who are 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
leaders who empathize with their employees adopt a participatory style and that shareholders gain from 
appointing such leaders when the firm has the potential for exploiting numerous innovative ideas”.  
8 A term in the framework convention on climate change and in the Rio Convention of 1992: ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’ can be interpreted as a signal that countries understand each other’s 
differences, or know each other’s ‘pain’, and and this feeds into a notion of fairness (see below).  
9 Sugden’s (1986) book on cooperation is excellently reviewing and discussion what we know of our 
cooperative abilities through game theory. Sugden highlights both human purpose (efficiency) and convention 
in the origin of fairness and institutions (such as property and accept of property), and his emphasis on starting 
out being nice, in a cooperative mode, is similar to our ‘early mitigation’, which may be just to start out nice for 
a conditional cooperator.  
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cooperative. The understanding of a player as ‘conditional cooperator’ or of ‘conditional 
cooperation’ as a strategy results from this line of research.    
Such behavior is harder to incorporate in theoretical settings without bounded rationality. As 
an example, in a repeated game where players could perhaps cooperate in early rounds 
because of the value in cooperation in future rounds, if there is a final round then cooperation 
cannot exist in the final, then not in the one before the final, and so on.  
In theory, a higher degree of cooperation can be sustained for a deeper and longer punishment 
of noncooperative behavior. However, with rational and forwardlooking individuals, it is 
difficult to see how the door for renegotiation can really be credibly and permanently closed. 
Though the ‘folk theorem’ for infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games establish that any 
level of cooperation can be attained for a sufficiently low discount rate, the argument is very 
vulnerable to questions about the time horizon, finiteness, the credibility of punishing with 
non-cooperation for ever, etc. We could mention here that for a problem which could involve 
catastrophic loss (Barrett, 2013, for instance), a punishment strategy of noncooperation for 
ever is a punishment flavored strongly enough to bring everyone into cooperation. But it 
might also be, by the same token, lacking in credibility10.  
The difficulty in building an argument about cooperation on punishment that is very costly 
(and/or lengthy), costly perhaps also to the punisher, is part of the pessimism and agnosticism 
in economics about how cooperation comes about.  
An important direction, though, is to bring in the possibility of norms, much along the lines of 
limited or bounded rationality approaches (i.e. I’ll cooperate because I’ve be taught to, and 
we’ll all cooperate because we’ve been taught to sanction noncooperators).  
The most obvious application is in coordination games, i.e. games with multiple equilibria, in 
which the question arises how an equilibrium is chosen. A coordination game like ‘should we 
drive on the left or the right side of the road’ has two equilibria (left, left, in the UK; right, 
right, in continental Europe), and either one could be implemented either by a first mover, if 
visible; or by a focal point or a norm, if known. Axelrod, inspired by and working with a 
biologist, could start with the premise that ants cooperate to build an ant-hill for the common 
(ant-people) good because they are programmed to, not because they resist the temptation to 
shirk. Such short programs can be thought of as rules of thumb, as norms, and they can of 
course include short programs for jointly punishing, shunning or eliminating anyone not 
cooperating or not in line with ant-hill code of conduct.  
In most coordination games, if a norm regulates behavior by many, then sanctions are 
typically not needed: there is no general temptation to defy the norm and drive on the right 
(hand) side in the UK). In some settings a threat of sanctions is needed, and in these one may 
                                                            
10 Dr Strangelove’s remark in Stanley Kubrick’s 1963 film: “Are you saying you made a doomsday machine and 
you did not tell anybody” illustrates two important poInts: i) in principle, creating and communicating an 
unbreakable unbreakable catastrophic mechanism (like a massive nuclear counterattack) would entice 
cooperation; ii) the depth of the catastrophe that itself commands cooperation, also dents the credibility in the 
mechanism. Would not the builder want to cheat?  
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have norms about punishing those who do not follow the norm (Denant-Beomont et al. (2007) 
analyses punishment behaviors). Then, coordination games more closely resemble public 
goods games, since in public goods games cooperation can be sustained by a norm if people 
act according to the norm (and selection of equilibrium is like choice of norm). As a theory of 
cooperation, however, it leaves unanswered how cooperation comes about if there is no theory 
about how norms are formed11.  
Acemoglu and Jackson (2011) studies norms of cooperation in an evolutionary context in a 
coordination game (i.e. different from a public goods provision game). This setting has 
multiple equilibria, with “low cooperation” and socially attractive “high cooperation”. Players 
wonder who they meet, and norms are ‘frames of reference’ that shape how information about 
the past is interpreted. Some players are equipped with ‘prominence’ – or visibility, and a 
prominent player may choose to break a social norm of ‘low’ cooperation (a socially 
unattractive equilibrium) to ‘high’.  
Their model can display stronger or weaker path dependence, so it is a model which can give 
weight to a few individuals in the evolution of norms and even even in long term history. It is 
thus an analysis that allows for individuals to make a difference – the way we are looking for 
– but which does this by exogenously giving certain individuals ‘prominence’. As in 
Hermalin, the inference others make is part of what motivates leaders. While Acemogly and 
Jackson analyses a coordination game rather than a public goods game, it is not without 
relevance given that the equilibria distinguish between higher and lower levels of cooperation, 
and their idea of how norms are shaped by history and leadership. Also, as we shall see 
below, public goods provision can be thought of as a question of burden sharing and fairness 
norms, and alternative fairness norms can transform a public goods game to a coordination 
game (Kosfeld et al, 2009).  
Leadership and cooperation on public goods provision in experimental settings 
Cooperation on public goods provision is among the topics of modern behavioral economics 
that has most been studied in experimental settings, often with students in a laboratory. A 
brief version of this literature is that students in early rounds of play contribute significantly 
more to provision than what is indicated by Nash equilibrium (in Nash equilibrium you 
contribute zero or almost zero), but these contributions decline in subsequent rounds as 
players observe others not contributing fully.  
An interpretation of this very general pattern is that individuals are somewhat influenced by 
social norms: many want to contribute if others do (but perhaps a little less: they are 
conditional cooperators). Since the average contribution that they observe reflects some low-
providers or noncooperators, they lower their contributions as well. Through the course of 
several rounds of play, average contributions tend downward, coming close to the Nash 
equilibrium or simply reflecting some unconditional contributors. This literature studies this 
                                                            
11 Hume, 1739, writes insightfully about norms and morals as human constructs built on purpose: «no action 
can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the 
sense of its morality», but is also convinced they rest on convention, tested through slow paced history.  
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process: how high is average cooperation in early rounds of play, and how slowly does it 
decline, and what seems to influence it. The general theme is one of free riding, but not in the 
sense that a high contribution makes others contribute less.  
A good example of this literature, is Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), who investigate the role 
of social preferences and beliefs. They conclude from repeated play: “contributions decline 
(in randomly composed groups) because, on average, people are imperfect conditional 
cooperators. After some time, all types behave like income-maximizing free riders, even 
though only a minority is motivated by pure income maximization alone.” In their 
communication of a central lesson, cooperation on public goods provision is inherently 
fragile, even if most people are not free riders but conditional cooperators.  
The role and interpretation regarding norms is important to Frey and Meier (2004), who report 
that ‘people behave pro-socially depending on the pro-social behavior of others’: Students 
contributed more to charity when they were presented with information that others 
contributed.  
Norms about cooperation are important in themselves in facilitating cooperation, but so is 
their reflection in our behavior, as through emotions such as anger and guilt. Hopfensitz and 
Reuben (2009) explore the idea that emotions, such as anger, help enforce and thus support 
cooperation through norms. They show that sanctioning behavior, too, may be deterred by 
counter-anger from those sanctioned, unless counter-anger is deterred (by guilt). This lends 
support to cooperation being facilitated by norms, with some relevance to our question, 
perhaps related to history and historic responsibility.  
This literature thus highlights that if norms are to be supportive of cooperative behavior, they 
have to be reflected in widely (and perhaps deeply) held values. This has motivated studies of 
fairness beliefs and norms that is largely positive:  
 what is it that people hold as being fair in the sense that they will cooperate and 
contribute if the burdensharing is considered fair?  
A background for this question can be the formation of entitlements we presently consider 
quite evident, such as property rights12. Cappelen et al. (2010) find evidence through public 
goods games that individuals attach responsibility more to contributions in terms of effort 
than to an exogenous variation in the productivity of that effort. Thus, sacrifice is more 
important to what is considered fair than a luck factor that makes the sacrifice more or less 
productive. Cappelen et al. (2012) pursues the question of whether motivation for 
contributions can be traced to intrinsic moral motivations or to extrinsic factors, such as guilt, 
shame and pride, finding evidence of both.    
Gächter and Riedl (2005) argue that entitlements, often based on a history that is no longer 
relevant (reflecting claims no longer feasible, for instance) can still represent ‘moral property 
rights’ that are influential in negotiations. Kosfield et al. (2009) shows that cooperation to 
                                                            
12 David Hume, previously cited, explores the origin of property rights and law as sensible arrangements from a 
practical point of view, important through how – when in human beliefs ‐ they influence behavior.  
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overcome free riding depends on the formation of institutions for sanctioning. In the mixed 
success with which these form, a problem is that an institutional coalition that forms is small, 
thus yielding both inequity and low provision. This is very much in line with Scott Barrett’s 
notion of self-enforcing agreements, typically mobilizing only a very small coalition of 
players (see below).  
Two important implications of fairness beliefs in this context are as follows. First, if many are 
conditional cooperators (they contribute if others contribute with what is seen as fair), then a 
joint understanding of fairness can help support cooperation. As it happens, though, most 
studies show such cooperation – when observed – somewhat fragile, not the least when player 
heterogeneity makes it less obvious what is fair13. 
The second implication, discussed by Kosfield et al. (2009) is both bad news and good news 
for cooperation. The bad news is that since fairness motives can act as a constraint on 
equilibria (page 1354), they may also represent risk of failure in the institution formation 
process. The good news is also related to this constraint. Not only is it the case that constraints 
that rule out certain equilibria can be useful in a multiple equilibrium context (i.e. in a 
coordination game) but they can also create equilibria. For instance, if it is considered unfair 
to let any small coalition carry the burden of provision, then this may facilitate the grand 
coalition forming the institution, yielding not only greater fairness but higher cooperation as a 
result. An important example of the bad news part is that in a uniform prisoner’s dilemma, an 
equity based fairness motive would not rule out the low-cooperation Nash equilibrium. An 
example of the good news is when Kosfield et al. point out that the small coalitions that can 
form an inefficient cooperative institutions often are inequitable and thus that greater 
efficiency may result when these are ruled out by fairness beliefs14.  
An important question has been leadership, starting with the observation that if a player 
moves early and contributes, then this raises the contribution from others relative to what they 
otherwise would have been (see also the importance of prominent players in Acemoglu and 
Jackson, above).  
Further studies have indicated that voluntary leadership in public goods games entails greater 
following - or  ‘positive spillovers’ - than does exogenously appointed leadership (Rivas and 
Sutter, 2011), providing further evidence that followers’ are thinking about the leader’s 
motives. This has been taken further in studies that ask whether the compensation of a 
voluntary leader matters. Cappelen et al. (2013 indicates that compensating the leader can 
raise contributions, including from followers, but that a very high compensation of the leader 
may ‘crowd out’ the contributions from ‘followers’. Moxnes and van der Heijden (2003) also 
finds positive effects of leadership in a public good experiment (an environmental one, in 
their representation). In a follow up study where they vary the costs to the leader of abatement 
                                                            
13 Reuben and Riedl (2009) examines fairness norms for contribution under heterogeneity.  
14 This is similar to the problem in cooperative game theory highlighted by Barrett (1994) and Chander and 
Tulkens, (1995), where it is the productivity of a relatively small coalition that prevents the grand coalition from 
forming, and anything that rules out small coalitions may be conducive of cooperation. See Battaglini and 
Harstad, 2013, in which contracting problems harm smaller coalitions more than greater coalitions, so 
contracting problems facilitate cooperation.  
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actions (van der Heiden and Moxnes, 2012), they find that there is more of a follower effect 
when the leader contributes despite costs (holding the costs for other players constant).  
While the researchers generally caution about the conclusions that can be drawn for real 
world environmental policies, they conclude that “it follows from our results and previous 
studies that taking a leading role will provoke greater reductions in global environmental 
problems than what follows directly from local abatement”.  
The literature based on experimental settings, despite the obvious questions of the relevance 
of the laboratory setting, has become quite influential, much because of the fundamental 
relevance of such questions as how cooperation in humans come about, and the shortcomings 
and puzzles left from other research avenues.  
We may note that in these studies of leadership’s positive effects on followers in the lab, we 
discover themes both of ‘sacrifice’ and of ‘signaling’ as indicated by Hermalin’s theoretical 
model.  
3: ‘Global problems require global solutions’ and the planner’s problem 
The preceding literature review has indicated that support can be found for ‘taking the lead’, 
in the sense that early action by some may raise contributions from others, though the settings 
are admittedly selective, the mechanisms may not all be known well, and are apparently 
vulnerable.  
In this section, we examine the basis for the more well-known warning against early, 
unilateral unconditional emission reductions. We start by visiting the ‘global problems require 
global solutions’ idea, which typically is seen as supportive of countries that are willing work 
for stronger international cooperation, rather than acting alone.  
The planner’s problem 
A simple version of the problem of tackling climate change is that global emissions (of 
greenhouse gas emissions, GHG) in this century have to be held to a certain limit15 
∑ ∑ ∑ ௝݁௧ଶଵ଴଴௧ୀଶ଴଴଴௦௝ ൑ ݁̅. 
                                                            
15 A focus on an emission budget for the century – or even for its first half, works fairly well for practical 
purposes. A recent contribution concludes that a centennial budget for six greenhouse gases is a good 
predictor for the likelihood that climate change beyond two degrees Celsius can be avoided (Anderson and 
Bows, 2011). Meinshausen et al 2009 uses cumulative emissions until 2050 as a predictor of this likelihood. 
Two degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels is a widely heralded policy goal, adopted by the international 
community through the 2009 Copenhagen Accord and for instance by the EU. The main point in our analysis, 
possible functional dependencies from early actions to later ones, and from some nations to others, does not 
depend on this simplification: main points will survive extension to more sophisticated models of our impacts 
on the climate. The most obviously useful extensions of this modeling framework is a depreciation of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere (which would lead to a greater acceptance of emissions early) and a 
damage to climate change before a presumed limit (which would lead to less acceptance of emissions early). 
The latter, a damage function, is introduced in section 5. Aaheim is an example of analysis in this directions, as 
is integrated assessment models such as Nordhaus’ DICE (2008).  
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Here, the summation over countries j could be simply North and South or it could be over the 
world’s 190 or so countries, s could be two or more sectors or all emitting sources. For 
instance, summation could be over all cars and homes, all firms and farms, all goats and 
dumps, all trees, all the twenty billion people that are around in the century if indeed we peak 
at nine or eleven billion. The summation over the century could be over 100 years as indicated 
here, over twenty five-year periods to indicate periods of quota commitments, for instance. 
We shall be simplistic and just use j=N,S, for countries and k and l for two sectors (or 
technologies, initiatives, projects, policies), where N shall typically be something like Norway 
or Europe or Annex 1 countries (or those that have committed to a cap for emissions for the 
years 2008 through 2012), and S can be ‘rest of the world’ or ‘South’ or India or China or 
Asia or USA. 
Reducing emissions will have a cost to mankind16. There are benefits too, but these are in this 
simplistic treatment all represented in our constraint on global century emissions. We may 
simplify to assume there are no benefits to reductions in climate change within the constraints 
and very high benefits of a avoiding any breach, so a breach is not considered.  
The foundation of the ‘cost effective solution’, and its implications 
A simple formulation may be that the world wants to minimize the net present value of the 
costs of containing emissions in this century to the limit for emissions, ݁̅: 
1: Minimize ∑ ∑ ∑ ௖ೕ,ೞ,೟൫௘ೕ೟൯ሺଵା௥ሻ೟ 	ଶ଴௧ୀ଴ଶ௦ୀଵ௝ୀே,ௌ 	subject to ∑ ∑ ௝݁௧ ൑ ݁̅ଶ଴௧ୀ଴௝ୀே,ௌ  
Thus, we want to find a set of emissions, or quantities emitted 
൥
݁ே,ଵ,଴ ⋯ ௌ݁,ଶ,଴
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
݁ே,ଵ,ଶ଴ ⋯ ௌ݁,ଶ,ଶ଴
൩ 
where there are columns as many as (two) sectors times countries, and where rows are time 
periods, here considered twenty five-year periods in this century (or the seventeen that are 
left: three rows already have numbers, emissions, fixed).   
The solution to problem 1 is a set of quantities satisfying three types of optimality conditions  
i)  డ௖ಿ,భ,బడ௘ಿ,భ,బ ൌ
డ௖ಿ,మ,బ
డ௘ಿ,మ,బ,  
or equal marginal costs across sectors (also actually more generally also across alternatives 
within sector, or activity). It applies generally, too, but we could first emphasize how this 
                                                            
16 The basic idea that such a cost follows from optimization theory is exploited for exhaustable resources in 
Weitzmann, 1999, who concludes that exhaustable resources are worth about one percent of world GDP. A 
heterogenous world and large reductions required strengthen the view widely held that costs will be 
considerable, and rent implications too. Energy subsidies indicate some emission reductions will be cheap.  
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applies internally within any group of countries acting on emission reductions, to call it cost 
effectiveness in the North, now.17 
A second implication, then is: 
ii) డ௖ಿ,ೞ,బడ௘ಿ,ೞ,బ ൌ
డ௖ೄ,ೞ,బ
డ௘ೄ,ೞ,బ 
This idea, which we could give the name global problems require global solutions, suggests 
that the world should take advantage of cheap emission reduction possibilities everywhere.18  
Finally, a third condition is:  
iii) డ௖ಿ,೔,భడ௘ಿ,೔,భ ൌ ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ
డ௖ಿ,೔,బ
డ௘ಿ,೔,బ,  and similar for later periods
19. 
We might call this condition we have started early.  
The intuition here is that emission reduction efforts have been introduced rather forcefully, so 
that only moderate cost increases is expected. This is the Hotelling rule for optimal use of an 
exhaustible resource, and many will have noticed that the formulation (1) above is describing 
the atmosphere’s ability to accept greenhouse gases simply as an exhaustible resource20.  
Despite the equality sign in iii), we emphasize the ‘urgency’ part of this condition: the 
expected cost of emissions should not rise by more than the real rate of interest, and for this to 
happen it must have risen to a certain level in the outset. If it rises by more in the future, the 
world foregoes early emission reduction possibilities and thus will have to attain them later at 
                                                            
17 Such a requirement also can be said to be reflected in instruments such as the European emission trading 
system, ETS, for instance, as well as the accompanying idea that EU’s emitting sources that are not in included 
in the ETS, should mitigate so as to have the same marginal costs as within ETS. Despite this ideal, in practice, 
even internally within ETS sectors there will not be equal marginal costs, because of such differentiated 
supplementary policies as support for renewable energy. See, for example, Böhringer et al. (2009), Eskeland, 
Mideksa and Rive (2011), and uniformity across non‐ETS sectors is an equally elusive goal. We shall argue 
below that for a subset of the grand table of global century emissions (like ETS emissions between 2012 and 
2020) it is difficult to arrive at a firm analytical foundation for a cost effectiveness criterion like this.  
18 This condition may be said to have inspired elements in international negotiations such as the flexibility 
mechanisms (allowance trade, clean development mechanism, and joint implementation). In that context, the 
fact that some countries are not or might not for some time be bound by emission caps should not prevent the 
world from seeking emission reductions in those countries, should reductions there prove to be cheap. 
19 Aaheim (2010) analyses the possibility that the discount rate itself is influenced by the climate problem. 
20 To describe the atmosphere as an exhaustible resource and to do the same for fossil fuels is the same as to 
state that we either have a problem of limited fossil fuels or one of climate change: we cannot have both 
problems. So acceptance of climate change as a challenge is the same as to say there is room for less carbon in 
the atmosphere than what we have and might otherwise want to burn of fossil fuels in this century. If the 
constraint of available fossil fuels were binding the challenges of building institutions would be simpler since, 
for fuel deposits, ‘exclusion’ and rivalry in consumption would make adherence incentive compatible. For an 
atmospheric constraint, building institutions that ensure abiding by the constraint is more challenging, not the 
least because the atmospheric constraint bears the characteristics of nonexcludability and nonrivalry – of 
‘commons’ or of ‘open access’.  
This condition, if we expand the model of the climate with a depreciation of carbon in the atmosphere, will be 
modified so that the shadow price of emissions increases with the real interest rate less the depreciation 
factor. So, if the real interest rate is 1.5% and the depreciation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is 0.5%, 
the shadow price of emissions should be rising by one percent per year.   
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an unnecessarily high cost. Not to regret past emission reduction possibilities of course 
requires that – at the formation of a cooperative arrangement – a treaty - the costs have 
quickly shot up to a sufficiently high level, so further increases will be moderate.  
The three conditions imply that the world should seek emission reductions everywhere so that 
no low-cost opportunity is foregone when costlier ones are pursued. As we shall argue in the 
following, in a world of nonglobal cooperation, criteria other than low costs of emission 
reductions will come into consideration.   
4: Pondering the problem of early mitigation in the absence of a strong global treaty 
We may start by mentioning a problem of applying the cost effectiveness criterion above if 
only some countries subject themselves to emission constraints. If in such a setting all 
emission reductions were sought globally, not only could taxes (or quotas) be used, but the tax 
rates (or quota prices) would be very low. Thus, there would be extremely many ‘intervention 
points’ (say, fuel taxes of a third of a cent per liter or kilo everywhere in the world). That 
would be how to apply the above cost effectiveness solution with a limited ‘budget’.  
So one might ask: in a world that is initially not very ambitious in terms of global emission 
reductions, would it all be about getting emission reductions globally at the lowest possible 
cost as indicated above, or would it (also) be important to demonstrate that larger reductions 
are feasible, for instance within some countries, some sectors, some settings? 
The solution to problem 1 satisfying conditions i) through iii) above, is a table of emissions (a 
set of quantities) as follows 
ܧതீ,଴	௧௢	ଶ଴ ൌ ൥
݁ே,௦,଴ ⋯ ௌ݁,௦,଴
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
݁ே,௦,ଶ଴ ⋯ ௌ݁,௦,ଶ଴
൩. 
In that formulation of the global problem, the important aspect for the climate is the sum of 
emissions both across global columns and century rows; the distribution of quantities across 
columns and rows is chosen only to minimize the discounted costs to mankind of not stressing 
the climate more than assumed acceptable or possible.  
Duration; years arrive in a sequence 
We have above described the climate challenge here as that of limiting the sum of emissions 
in this century to a given constraint. There is no complacency in this; for a given tight limit 
acceptable to the atmosphere, it could imply emissions were almost eliminated by the middle 
of the century (important scenarios, for instance the 2 degree ones, demand emission 
reductions of 80 percent by 2050: if the world economy triples, its emission intensity must fall 
not by four fifths, but by fourteen fifteens).  
Nevertheless, almost a century – or even a half – is a lot of time in important ways. First and 
foremost, it is enough time that if some countries were to make important choices, like 
emission cuts or power plant investments, they and other countries would have subsequent 
choices before time is out. Those subsequent choices would no doubt be influenced by that 
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history. As noted in section 2: if later actions are influenced by early actions, then this will 
influence early actions. This is what we want to acknowledge.  
To make a simple calculation, if world emissions in the business as usual case grows by one 
percent per annum (one percent improvement in carbon productivity – or carbon intensity- as 
Stern suggests, combined with two percent economic growth), then in addressing an early five 
year period in the century, one addresses only three percent of this century’s ‘business as 
usual’ emissions. If these emissions are cut by five to twenty percent in a region representing 
a fifth of global total, then the world is reducing this century’s global emissions with three 
hundredths of one percent to two tenths of one percent21.  
The less obvious observation, at the heart of this paper is:  
Observation1: Any early emission reductions are of importance if and only if they have 
consequences for future emissions 
Looking at the numbers, this is a rather obvious point, not a very subtle one. Any early period 
of five to fifteen years is long enough to cause observation, rethinking, and new actions, but 
anything a subset of countries does in some early years would have its motivation in 
consequences for future trajectories of global emissions: own and those of others. With a limit 
for global century emissions, all that matters is shifting from one trajectory of growth to one 
of substantial global decline quite soon. In a world of underlying growth that can be done only 
when actions to cut emissions instigate further actions to cut emissions.  
A point that follows from observation 1 also is fairly obvious: Early actions other than 
emission reductions that could have consequence for the trajectory of emissions through this 
century should be examined with interest equal to early emission reductions. In other words: 
as soon as we leave the artificial world of one global planner, the focus in formulation 1 on 
emissions alone is far too restrictive. As an example, teaching sciences, natural and social, in 
primary schools from Kenya to Kentucky, is on menu of early actions that go beyond only 
emission reductions.  
Participation; no country, no sector is acting in isolation 
Early reducers, for instance in Europe, presently represent a minor share of current global 
emissions (a seventh, or a fifth). Still, their emissions as a share of global will decline through 
this century: 
 if only because other countries’ have higher growth rates, or higher growth rates in 
emitting sectors, because of population growth, of catching up, of have higher 
emission propensities, less advanced technologies; 
 as a direct consequence of the measures these early reducers take; 
 and to the extent that the measures cause carbon leakage (see below). 
                                                            
21 This could be Europe’s reductions in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, 2008 through 2012, 
or some version of the Europe’s ambition of 20 percent reduction in the eight year period from 2013 to 2020.  
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Observation 2: Measures among a set of ‘early reducers’ that is less than global – be they 
emission reductions or other actions or consequences – are of importance for the climate only 
if - and in the way that - they influence emissions from other countries / sectors. 
Again, this is an obvious consequence of economic development, energy being normal in the 
sense that a country tends to use more as it gets richer, and fossil energy being sufficiently 
abundant.  
Observations 1 and 2 cut across rows and columns, respectively, in the table of the century’s 
emissions. Present approaches, such as the tradable allowances for Annex 1 countries in the 
Kyoto Protocol, and also ETS, a system for trading quotas within European firms, can be 
thought of as windows to allow – within period and between early reducers – some of the 
gains from cost effectiveness to be played out between columns (Annex 1) and rows (2008 
through 2012) in the table.  
Our point, here, is that – given Observation 1 and 2 - we have no result in economics nor in 
optimization more generally giving a compelling rationale for this equalization of marginal 
costs within a subset of cells, say of acting countries in a five or ten year period. If some types 
of cuts or other actions were to have greater consequence for global emissions than others, 
then those would obviously be favored.  
In practice, countries within EU work harder in changing the power sector than in changing 
the metals sector (the power sector has quota price plus renable support). This could be biases 
caused by the way actions must be phased in a world with nonglobal cooperation.  
Carbon leakage: important phenomena 
While one may think of a table of emissions for this century,  ܧതீ,଴	௧௢	ଶ଴,like 1) it is not so 
obvious what one would mean if describing a table of emission ܧതே,଴,௧ where countries N had 
restrained their emissions (perhaps internally cost effectively) for some years t (say five, or 
eight, or until 2050) while the rest of the world were stipulated with some ‘business as usual’ 
emissions. What is ‘usual’ for the rest of the world and the rest of the century if part of the 
world acts forcefully in some way?  
Carbon leakage is the fact that if a country reduces its emissions – uses less fossil fuels or 
produces less cement than it otherwise would - emissions in other countries may increase, 
though typically by ‘less than 100 percent’ of the initial reduction22: 
To detail the mechanisms of carbon leakage, we might use a list of three points as follows: 
                                                            
22 Hertwich and Peters (2009) provide estimates on carbon leakage through evidence on countries’ changes in 
consumption, production and trade. Bernard and Vielle (2009) quantifies leakage and Frankel (2008/9) 
discusses remedies. Sinn (2008) and Harstad (2012) analyses supply side measures as alternatives / 
supplements to demand side measures in a world of nonglobal cooperation. Edenhofer and Kalkuhl (2011) and 
van der Ploeg and Withagen (2009) analyses the existence/importance of the ‘green paradox’. The case of 
carbon leakage rates greater than 100 percent is possible in theory through energy intensive tradables like 
metals or cement, if production moves to jurisdictions with more emission intensive practices. In applied 
analysis, such high leakage rates are not found, more often they are found in the range of five to fifty percenet 
for energy intensive tradables (Böhringer et al. 2009, Eskeland et al., 2012,  are two examples). 
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i) By lowering world prices for fossil fuels, reductions in demand for fossil fuels among 
some will lead to increased use among others, as long as fuel supply is not infinitely 
elastic (which it can hardly be); 
ii) Emission-intensive activities – especially production of energy intensive tradable 
goods such as cement, metals, fertilizer, glass, ceramics, chemical products – may 
relocate to countries with no emission reduction policies (or costs), without much 
reduction in global consumption or emissions; 
iii) An expectation of future emission reduction policies threatens future fossil reserve 
rents and creates a race that accelerates present extraction.  
Interesting about iii) the “green paradox” – due to Hans Werner-Sinn – is the possibility that 
emerging or expected climate policy increases emissions in early periods, by causing a race 
for threatened fossil rents and thus accelerating climate change. Indeed, these instances of 
carbon leakage are consequences of the cost effectiveness criteria in section 3 being violated. 
Sinn’s green paradox, for instance, follow when a too steep emissions’ price is expected.  
Observation 3: Realizing that emissions policy in some early years for some countries is 
motivated by global century emissions, early contributors will not restrict attention to own 
emissions and their costs or to total emissions and costs in those early years.   
First, we should notice that the consequences for the century’s global emissions will depend 
not only on early emissions but also on how early emissions are reduced. Second, global 
century emissions may be brought down in this century by choices made early – R&D 
investments for instance - without emission reductions those early years. For both of these, 
behavioral consequences amongst other countries will be important: these may be dependent 
on cost effectiveness, but not solely.  
Hoel (1996), for instance, asks whether carbon taxes (quotas would be the same) for 
participating countries should be differentiated across sectors due to carbon leakage, 
answering that this is not desirable provided one can use tariffs on exports and imports. If 
such trade policy measures cannot be used, carbon tax differentiation across sectors would be 
desirable. Also, in a world of nonglobal cooperation, participating countries would address 
both supply of fossil fuels and demand, while under global cooperation, addressing one side 
would suffice.  
Retracing the argument a little, there are good reasons to think of emissions in some early 
years, or early emission reductions, as reducing global emissions in this century. Such 
reductions may be tailored to avoid carbon leakage, or keep it acceptable levels. The point 
more generally stated is: influence from some nations, some years, on global emissions in this 
century can in no meaningful way be summarized through emitted quantities in those 
countries, those years.  
The practical part of the how argument is simple: Carbon leakage means that a national 
emission reduction often will only in part result in a global reduction. Leakage can be limited, 
both by how a country goes about its emission reductions, and by accompanying policies (see 
Frankel, 2008/2009, for instance, or Fischer and Fox, 2009). On the first, leakage will be 
21 
 
smaller if you reduce emissions in rather protected sectors, like the heating of buildings, 
domestic transport, and electricity generation, than if you reduce emissions from producing 
energy intensive tradables, like steel. And leakage from emission reductions in energy 
intensive tradables will be smaller if production persists – perhaps with help of trade policy 
measures such border tax adjustments, or free quotas – than if you scale down output23. And 
smaller if you support electricity generation with renewable support than if you let emission 
costs drive electricity tariffs and output. And smaller if you invest in R&D than if you reduce 
output of emission intensive tradables. Nevertheless, a part will likely remain which is 
conveyed through world fossil fuel prices (as Hans Werner-Sinn rightly emphasizes). It is the 
steepness of the supply curve for fossil fuels that creates leakage, in combination with the low 
price elasticity of demand. At more general policy levels, leakage can be fought with trade 
policy measures: if you export emission intensive products – like metals – into participating 
countries, you’ll be paying ‘border tax adjustments’ that counter your cost advantage. 
Similarly, as analysed by Harstad (2013), Hoel (1994) and Sinn (2008): participating 
countries will want not only to address demand but also supply of fossil fuels.  
5: Supply of public goods and the free rider problem 
An economic perspective is that climate change mitigation – or emission reduction efforts – is 
to provide a public good, with key contributons by Paul Samuelson (1954), Charles Tiebout 
(1956), Agnar Sandmo (1972). Samuelson points out that optimal supply requires that the 
sum across beneficiaries of marginal benefits to equal to marginal costs, Tiebout that 
exclusion may facilitate provision for local public goods in a market context, and Sandmo 
(1972) develops the case for collective inputs, which seems to be a relevant case for climate 
change (impacts are often described as harming agriculture, infrastructure, buildings, etc., see 
IPCC, for instance, or Stern, 2007). 
The standard textbook treatment of public goods provision is that a free rider problem arises: 
Even if everyone wants the good supplied, individual agents will provide less individually 
than what together is required for optimal supply: 
i) She is enticed to provide only according to her own marginal benefits of her 
provision, not taking into account the benefits to others (she is, inter alia, not able to 
charge others for the benefits accruing to them due to her efforts).  
ii) In fact, if one agent is providing so as to increase the level supplied of the public 
good, others might be induced to reduce their provision below what they otherwise 
would have provided.  
Characterizing an equilibrium without cooperation – as a Nash equilibrium in quantities, for 
instance – i) typically involves each agent taking into account only her own share of benefits.  
                                                            
23 Free quotas could in theory be nondistortionary – not acting as a subsidy to output – if they were given on 
the basis of exogenous characteristics, but as a flow they will typically disappear if a steel producer ends being 
a steel producer. Thus, free quotas may be interpreted as proxying what border tax adjustments would do: 
limit the carbon leakage that would happen if steel producers had to buy all their quotas. See Harstad and 
Eskeland, 2010 for an analysis of quotas as a signaling game, recognizing politicians’ commitment problems.  
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For the climate problem, one could think of a country taking into account only that country’s 
(or also only a present generation’s) share of total global benefits, so this could mean 
emission reductions were undervalued to the amount of 
 one two hundredth of global benefits if benefits were equal for two hundred equal 
countries,  
 one twelve hundredth if benefits were equal for each of six generations of two hundred 
countries, or  
 a country’s present share in global population now if benefits were in proportion to 
population (a fifth, for India or China, a twentieth, for US) 
 or a country’s share in global income, agriculture, etc24. 
In any of these versions, noncooperative provision of the public good would be very far from 
globally optimal, and on an axis from zero mitigation to optimal, it would be for most 
countries much closer to zero – indistinguishably from zero, perhaps - than to socially 
optimal.  
Due to this free rider problem in public goods provision, government provision (or coercion, 
as with regulation and taxes) is typically recommended for such subnational or national public 
goods as local air quality, rule of law, and national defense.  
For a global public good like climate change mitigation, however, even without authoritative 
global government, sovereign states can achieve provision – mitigation - through a treaty. In a 
situation with two players, for a public good that is worth providing collectively, an 
enforceable treaty can ensure optimal provision.  
For more players, or countries, as in a world with near two hundred countries and more than 
six generations of beneficiaries necessary to justify serious dent in emissions25, many would 
prefer not to participate in the treaty, rather hoping others to pull the load. Using standard 
concepts in cooperative game theory, Scott Barrett (in his 2004 book, for instance), 
demonstrates that in games with multiple players (the number n of players three or higher) 
participation in a treaty will be low, and provision of the public good will be low. As in the 
case of noncooperative game theory, above, provision of emission reductions will be much 
below what is optimal for society as a whole, if not actually zero. In Barrett’s (2004) words, 
when the number of players is large, “and the gains to cooperation are large, a self-enforcing 
treaty cannot sustain a high participation rate and so is unable to make much of a difference”.  
The problem is, in light of cooperative game theory, quite deep and untractable. If the 
structure of payoffs is really ‘all or nothing’ so that it is detrimental not to have global 
                                                            
24 Hannesson looks into some consequences for treaty formation, selfenforcing treaties, of alternative benefit 
assumptions, like these.  
25 Stern’s review reflects that benefits of mitigation in the second and third century of this millennium are 
necessary to make a case for mitigation now, requiring a discount rate at 1.4 per cent per annum. 
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participation, then global participation in provision is facilitated in a self-enforcing treaty26. 
But the more typical structure of underlying economics for public good provision is that some 
coalitions smaller than the grand coalition can attain a significant portion of the gains to 
global participation. In this case, since the productivity of smaller coalitions eliminate an “all 
or nothing” structure, a setting with partial cooperation – perhaps as few as two players – will 
prevent larger cooperative coaltions. However, since in a game with more than two players 
there will often be more than one potential coalition that could contribute with emission 
reductions, even this contribution will be small or late or doubtful27.  
Game theory in general is quite pessimistic about cooperation, and one could say: does not 
know a lot about how cooperation comes about. Important ideas are reminiscent of trying to 
convert a game into an ‘all or nothing’ game, and the logic is simple: Free riding ‘on the bus’ 
reflects appreciation of the bus service and a belief that the bus will be running independently 
of whether I pay for riding. If it were credibly the case that the bus would not run if I did not 
pay, then payment is a certainty and free riding is not a problem. A framework for 
cooperation can thus be described as an attempt to create such all-or-nothing structures28.  
We can use this example, though, to point back to the literature that uses norms and fairness 
to structure the analysis of cooperation. A Kantian imperative, for instance, can be seen as a 
norm that you cannot consider not paying on the bus unless you consider nobody paying on 
the bus. In that case, it is clear to you that if nobody pays on the bus, then the bus will 
disappear, and you rather pay. Thus, if a Kantian imperative is imposed, then one has 
converted the bus existence game into an all or nothing game, and the bus can exist. Bus 
services and other cooperative ventures will thus be more frequently observed on planets were 
fairness norms (like Kantian imperatives) are regulating behavior of individuals, generations, 
and countries.  
From a player’s perspective, an attempt ‘to convert the game’ can be if she can commit to a 
strategy of ‘I’ll cooperate if you cooperate’29. Indeed, in a one shot game, if players can 
                                                            
26 The role of ‘all or nothing’ type games is discussed in Barrett ‘Self enforcing international environmental 
agreements’ (1994). For climate change, all or nothing can be envisaged as an edge or a cliff or a tipping point 
for catastrophic climate change, see for instance Barrett (2013) and Barrett and Dannenberg (2012).   
27 A good illustration of this is a game with three players with benefits of global cooperation 1 compared to 
zero for noncooperation and alfa to any twoparty coalition. In this case, if alfa is greater than 2/3, so that a 
nonglobal coalition is also quite productive, cooperative game theory is unable to argue for global cooperation 
(in technical terms: the core is empty). If nonglobal cooperation is not quite productive, alfa smaller than 2/3, 
the game is an all or nothing game, and the game theoretic case for global cooperation actually coming about is 
quite compelling. With a higher number of players, in the analytics of cooperative game theory, cooperation is 
more difficult to attain. More specifically, for more players, the closer must a game be an all or nothing game 
for the core not to be empty.  
28 Wood 2010, presents and summarizes results, developing the problem from the perspective of mechanism 
design. He points out that concepts ruling out smaller coalitions (as with Chander and Tulkens, 1997, see Riedl 
et al, cited above) may be questionable in terms of credibility.  
29 The US Senate’s Byrd Hagel resolution (it will not be the sense of the Senate to ratify an agreement if it will 
“mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the 
protocol .. also mandates .. to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within 
the same compliance period “)  and EU’s declaration (to reduce emissions 20 percent by 2020, and 30 percent 
if important other countries/regions also take part) both appear to communicate something like conditionally 
matching reductions, much like this line of reasoning in game theory would convey.  
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commit to such a strategy (‘I’ll reduce emissions if you do’) and a contract can be made 
enforceable, then cooperative game theory predicts global cooperation. But is such a strategy, 
such a commitment credible? Many analysts have looked into this, including for repeated 
games, and it is not easy to see that such a formation of cooperation is credible. Importantly, 
adherence to cooperation must be sustained by a credible threat of punishment for 
noncooperators (‘defectors’, or ‘emitters’), and to attain high levels of cooperation, such 
punishment must be both deep and long and unforgiving. This is indeed very difficult to 
envisage for a problem such as climate change30.  
For climate change mitigation, it may be that some significant subset of players (US, Europe, 
and China, say, or two of these three) in terms of early action could achieve quite a significant 
part of what a global coalition could achieve. According to cooperative game theory, this fact 
makes cooperation difficult to achieve – at least early in this century - simply because 
nonimportant and important players want other important players to pull the load 31 . In 
Barrett’s (1994) framework, since a coalition of two often will be the largest feasible 
irrespective of the total number of players, cooperation is hard to envisage even between these 
three prominent players32. Our argument turns this around: since it is clear that even a quite 
big coalition with early action can do very little with the climate problem unless almost 
everyone joins, early action cannot itself much harm global cooperation.  
Unilateral and unconditional emission reductions by a country or a small coalition  
Whether a small coalition forms or not (one may argue that a country or Europe or the US or 
the North Eastern United States are such coalitions), an important question is whether a 
consequence of its unconditional unilateral emission reductions would be free riding in the 
explicit sense that other countries then make less of an emission reduction effort in response 
to this. In this discussion, we shall abstract from ‘carbon leakage’, dealt with above. We shall 
simply examine free riding in response to early unilateral unconditional emission reductions 
motivated by reduced (threat of) climatic change.  
As a starting point, one may assume that another country j acts according to a one-period 
noncooperative condition, in the sense of taking other countries’ quantities of emissions as 
given.  
                                                            
30 In infinitely repeated games, high levels of cooperation can be sustained through such threats if discount 
rates are low. This observation builds a bridge between the low discount rates that are required for mitigation 
in global cost benefit analysis (key contributions are the Stern Review and Weitzman, 2007), and those required 
at the individual or country level to attain cooperation. Weitzman (2007) argues an insurance perspective 
rather than the usual one in savings and investment models to render mitigation benefits sufficient weight. Tol 
and Yohe (2006) and Sterner and Persson, 2008,  discuss the discounting in the benefit cost analysis of the 
climate problem. 
31 Hannesson explores Barrett’s type of question with heterogeneously sized nations, still finding mitigating 
coalitions small, and especially so if countries large in emissions and not the same as those large in benefits 
from slowing climate change. These findings are supportive of our argument below.  
32 Battaglini and Harstad (2012) analyse an aspect of climate change agreements when a holdup problem 
relates to noncontractible investment. The noncontractability harms smaller coalitions more than larger, and 
can thus – counterintuitively ‐ facilitate more cooperation.  
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To make things simple, assume emissions are the same as the use of fossil fuels, a tradable. A 
country j for this given period maximizes its welfare ߨ with respect to fuel use q in this period 
less its share v of damages d from climate change. These damages should be thought of as the 
sum of discounted damages in the future – so emissions Q=∑ ∑ ݍ௧௝௧௝  are summed over 
countries and periods in this century: 
ߨ௝ ൌ ݂௝൫ݍ௝൯ െ ݌ݍ௝ ൅ ݒ௝݀ሺ∑ ∑ ݍ௝௧௧௝ ) 
Here, p is the world market price for fossil fuel, and abstracting from carbon leakage means 
we assume p a constant. If fuel is supplied infinitely elastically, then there is no leakage if a 
country reduces its fuel use. Damages ݀ሺܳሻ are damages from climate change, so first and 
second derivatives are both negative, possibly catastrophic, so d’s first derivative may 
approach minus infinite for large finite Q. We can think of the model used earlier, with a 
constraint for total emissions (and not damages within the constraint) as being a simplified 
version of this model, or alternatively as an implementation formulation meant to avert risk if 
damages d reflecting risks like catastrophes are the motivating ones (see Barrett, 2013, on 
how catastrophic risks is relevant to cooperation). Alternatively, the correspondence between 
the two models could go the other way: if there is an absolute limit, but d(Q) could represent 
the probability of not satisfying the limit, thus making a continuous and differentiable version 
of the absolute limit used in problem 1.  
A simple setting is one in which country j maximizes ߨ௝ in this period taking emissions from 
other countries and in other periods as given. The first order condition for j’s optimal 
emissions (or fuel use) is then 
(1) డ௙
ೕ
డ௤ೕ െ ݌ ൅ ݒ௝݀′ ൌ 0 
The case with the third term equal to zero represents an important reference point.  A country 
j that does not reduce its own emissions beyond the point where marginal productivity of fuel 
equals its cost, ߲݂௝ ߲ݍ௝⁄ ൌ ݌, could be one that  
a) does not have, perceive or pay attention to future damages from climate change, or  
b) one that considers its share ݒ௝ of these damages to be zero, or  
c) one that considers its influence on climate change through own emissions to be zero. 
c) could be because its share or present share in global century emissions are very small. 
Alternatively, somewhat outside the formulation used here, it could be a country that 
considers other countries will eventually make up for its emissions, whether they are raised or 
reduced, but this we shall leave to the discussion of alternative behavioral assumptions.  
In all these cases (a,b,c), country j uses fossil fuel to the point where its marginal product 
equals its world market price:  
(2) డ௙
ೕ
డ௤ೕ ൌ ݌. 
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Let us notice that it is only thorough the third term, ݒ௝݀′  - the term that is zero in cases a) 
through c) that j’s optimal emissions can possibly be influenced by other countries’ 
emissions33. 
Now, if we allow for the (free riding) possibility that ݍ௝ responds to other countries’ change 
in emissions ݀ܳି௝ , then ݍ௝	൫ܳି௝൯ would respond such as to restore (1) above: 
(2) డ
మ௙ೕ
డ௤ೕమ
డ௤ೕ
డொషೕ ݀ܳି௝ ൅ ݒ௝
డమௗ
డொమ ቀ1 ൅
డ௤ೕ
డொషೕቁ ݀ܳି௝ ൌ 0, or 
(3) డ௤
ೕ
డொషೕ ൌ
ି௩ೕങమ೏ങೂమ
ങమ೑ೕ
ങ೜ೕమ
ା௩ೕങమ೏ങೂమ
 
Let us remember from above, a,b and c the important cases when there is no response in 
emissions from j, so ߲ݍ௝ ߲ܳି௝ൗ  is zero. (3) highlights that in the case when it is not zero, it is 
strictly negative (the numerator is positive by assumption, the denominator negative by the 2nd 
order condition for j’s optimum), meaning that an emission reduction from other players 
instigates an emission increase from j, and vice versa. According to (3), such a case exists 
only for a country j acknowledging damages to itself from climate change (the numerator) 
and seeing itself able to influence climate change. Morover, j’s response in emissions has 
minus 1 as a limiting case if the marginal productivity of emissions to j is constant 
ሺ߲ଶ݂௝ ߲ݍ௝ଶൗ ൌ 0). This argument holds also if j is a coalition of countries (to go through it, it 
simplifies to think in terms of just two players or groups).  
In the situation we depict here, we exclude carbon embodied in trade, and then the important 
use of fuel (emissions) is for ‘domestic’ purposes, such as transport – our cars -, buildings – 
our homes and offices -, and electricity generation – for our light bulbs and fridges. In those 
uses, the marginal productivity (or the value of the marginal product) of fuel is strictly 
declining, and a free riding response in the sense of (3) will be strictly smaller than 100 
percent (߲ݍ௝ ߲ܳି௝ൗ ൐ െ1), and equal to zero in cases a, b and c, above.   
We now conclude with  
Observation 4: In response to early, unilateral and unconditional emission reductions, a 
country (or several) may free-ride and raise its emissions, but only if  
i) those emission reductions are large enough that it perceives the prospects for climate 
change are reduced, AND 
                                                            
33 Hoel, 1991, formulates ‘unilateral action’ by explicitly changing the country’s reaction function (country acts 
as if ݒ௝	 is higher, in our formulation), showing that global emissions will typically  decrease if a lowcost country 
makes a small unilateral move from the Nash equilibrium base, and also under cooperation in the Nash 
bargaining solution case. Obviously, unilateral action will be costly and in some cases raise emissions relative to 
a treaty, which is assumed efficient. Our concern here is different for two reasons: i) we are concerned about 
what happens before or without a treaty, and what can influence a treaty being entered, and ii) we consider 
the case Hoel excludes “I have ignored the question of whether unilateral emission reductions by one country 
may lead to similar behavior by other countries’.  
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ii) the country itself perceives and pays attention to climate change and damages to itself, 
AND  
iii) considers that it has through its own emissions influence on climate change. 
In the case all of these three are satisfied for one or more responding countries, the increase 
in emissions will jointly be limited not to exceed the initial reduction, and will typically be 
strictly smaller34. 
An informal way of putting observation 4 is that a country or a coalition to be deterred from 
early unconditional unilateral emission reductions through concerns for inducing free riding 
would have both to think about itself as being big in terms of emissions and about potential 
free riders as big in terms of their emissions and vulnerable to climate change. This is of 
course not an impossible scenario, though it is a fact that many nations who are vulnerable are 
not big in terms of emissions now (vulnerable nations are poor nations, according to IPCC), 
and – as argued earlier - most who consider emission reductions now are not really big 
enough in terms of centennial emissions that they come anywhere close to meeting the 
climate challenge on their own. 
Along these lines, it would be countries or coalitions that are big in terms of global emission 
reduction potential in this century and considering to take the lead that could worry about 
other’s free riding responses. It is possible, thus, that nonlarge countries would have an edge 
in leadership, simply because they need not consider that others see them as fixing the climate 
problem, while they could see them as interesting test cases.  
Speculation might be easier using names, here, but in terms of methodology a question is 
whether energy taxes, emission costs or other domestic policy variables could serve as an 
indicator of a country’s own concern for climate change impacts. Clearly this can be 
misleading: a) a country may have no or weak climate policy not because it is not interested 
but for other reasons (as the Byrd Hagel resolution indicates, for instance) and b) because a 
free riding response in the sense we analyze here could be in terms of reduced future climate 
policy. Still, if early action is leadership, leadership could perhaps lead into stronger treaties, 
limiting the deterrence that lies in concerns about induced freeriding further into the future.  
A concern for inducing free riding is not farfetched, and not farfetched as a deterrent to early 
unilateral unconditional action. But we should notice that our analysis here indicated that such 
concerns would be less among smaller countries, so it it perhaps the case that EU in this 
regard, if it is an early mover, is small or acts as a bundle of small countries (its share in 
century global emissions is, in fact, not large).  
We have, however, argued above that it is possible through behavioral models to envisage 
responses in the opposite direction; that early movers through norms or signaling can 
stimulate rather than threaten the subsequent emission reductions from others. Reading the 
two sections together, we might conclude either that smaller countries or coalitions in so case 
may have an advantage in taking a leadership role, since they have less reason to worry about 
                                                            
34 The ‘strictly smaller’ part of this statement applies also if one includes carbon leakage in the response.  
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inducing increases in free riding, or – but this is clearly a judgment case and more speculative 
– that even big countries and groups as large as Europe or USA are not big enough to worry 
or to be worried about free riding responses induced by early action in a few early decades of 
this century.   
6: Discussion: can a leadership perspective apply to early contributions? 
Is climate policy about leadership? 
Unilateral and unconditional emission reductions in an early phase without a treaty ensuring 
global participation (or under a weak treaty) involves difficult questions. We have argued that 
countries moving early may be motivated directly by leadership, i.e. that others will be 
enticed to emission reductions because of those early actions.  
A leader that signals through her early actions likely conveys her beliefs that emission 
reductions are feasible, not prohibitively costly, are adoptable more broadly, and are worth it. 
We believe the latter part – worth it – is not the most important part of signaling in the sense 
of private information, but it obviously a part of what goes on. Hermalin, who describes the 
private information held by the leader in public goods provision as information about the 
productivity of a public goods project, finds that signaling can be through example or through 
sacrifice.  
Fairness beliefs and norms also can govern public goods provision, including early action. If 
players are conditional cooperators, they will be observing others’ actions and can be moved 
positively to contribute more than they otherwise would if there has been early mitigation.  
Both in the case of signaling and in the case of fairness beliefs, the possibility of instigating a 
following motivates leadership, and shapes it.  
Three lines of cautioning should not be lightly dismissed.  
First, early movers will be concerned about carbon leakage, seeking to limit it, accepting it 
only to some degree. Leadership is, after all, about making others support your direction of 
emission reductions, not about inviting others to undermine them.  
Second, early mitigation might be deterred by concerns for instigating more free riding from 
others. We argue that for many countries such concerns will be minor if present at all, the 
argument being that the remaining burden of mitigation is large – not markedly smaller – even 
if countries quite large in emissions were to be quite successful and quite aggressive 
quantitatively for a few decades. Countries or regions that represent a fifth or a twentieth of 
global income, of global population, of global emissions have in common that they hardly can 
– by early mitigation in a few decades of this century – give other countries reason to be less 
willing to engage in mitigation.  
An example calculation can be that even if early movers represented half of world’s emissions 
and eliminated them completely, climate scientists recommend global reductions of 80% by 
2050, so a tremendous and growing job would still be left for ‘the others’.  
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We show that concerns for increased freeriding would be greatest for someone who is great in 
terms of emissions and face others who are both great in terms of emissions and vulnerable to 
climate change. Even in this case, this concern would shape the actions of a country or a 
coalition wanting to act early: spending more on demonstration, R&D and on reducing costs, 
showing adoptability, less perhaps on reducing emissions. A country showing leadership 
would be thinking ahead, on the goals and behavior of others, and on how to support future 
reductions and the formation of a treaty.  
Third: The fact that leadership perspective can shape early action should not exclude but 
rather be informed about the urgency of pressing for stronger global participation.  
How does the leadership perspective inform early action? 
We might invoke the ideas by hypothesizing:  
Say that in a situation without a treaty (or a pretty weak one), a small country does something 
to reduce emissions in one to three decades early in this century. Then, a big country (or 
several): 
 observes this,  
 asks some questions, say in 2020 or 2040 and  
 concludes: We shall do something like that, too.  
What could it be that the small country had done, and what would the big country’s questions 
be?  
Our suggestion is that the ‘following’ country would ask: 
i) have you reduced your own emissions? 
ii) did it cost you a lot? 
iii) can I do it? 
iv) why should I? 
These suggestions are based on ideas from literature on leadership and cooperation. We may 
notice that climate negotiations and policy till now largely has focused on question iv), how to 
provide incentives for emission reductions. One may conclude from our analysis that i) 
through iii) has received too little attention.  
Somewhat speculatively, building on the above discussion, tentative answers to these four 
questions, would be  
i) Yes, I have. Come over and take a look. I have emission free cities, buildings, cars, 
fertilizer. I am even working on an emission free coal fired power plant, and aviation 
fuels. 
ii) Well it has cost me. I would not advise you to go to this task empty handed. But as 
you can see, none of these measures threatens my lifestyle or my competitiveness. In 
some areas, you can see the solutions are getting cheaper, and this will accelerate as 
others join. In other areas, we have invested in technological change. We chose 
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fertilizer, cement and carbon capture and storage – because we felt some obstacles to 
global cooperation had to be tested. And in some areas you’ll see we earned some 
other benefits, like cleaner air, less traffic jam. In some areas, we have made little 
progress.  
iii) Much of it, surely, applies directly to you. And we also have done some nice projects 
together, in areas where adoptability in your setting was not so obvious. Like in 
tropical forests, agriculture and solar thermal.  
iv) Well, look around. We are in this together. It has to be done everywhere. Others are 
joining. It makes sense. Nobody wants to be outside, and we’ll find ways to share the 
burden fairly. And we’ll assist each other, trade, create new technologies, make them 
accessible. Surely, we’ll look into incentives and ways to help each other out. 
We may notice that there is very little of cost effectiveness here, there is quite a lot of 
signaling. Costs are respected; nothing will work if prohibitively costly, but it is also the case 
that once broad adoption is possible, solutions may be feasible that are out of the question 
either at a smaller scale or for a country acting alone in a globalized world. This is also why 
R&D can be as important as emission reductions in an early phase.  
R&D can bring future costs down, or show feasibility, as for instance with carbon capture and 
storage. If it can be shown not to be prohibitively costly, it will likely have an important 
effect. Given that windmills and solar can be in the range of twice as expensive as low-cost 
(carbon intensive) electric power generation, prohibitive would have to mean more in the 
range of three to times more expensive. Estimates for the costs of CCS (see IEA, for instance) 
are in the range of adding fifty to hundred percent to the cost of power, so presently the 
expected costs are not as deterring as is the fact that it is not demonstrated.  
Signaling that a low-carbon society is feasible can be required not only in technical but also 
social, behavioral and political spheres. Whether a low-carbon city is with low transportation 
intensity or with low-carbon transport, whether it is dense, whether internet takes over, all of 
these questions may be raised and answered.  
To represent leadership, a low-carbon city has to be surprisingly liveable, politically feasible: 
it has to be an eye-opening experience.  Obviously, nobody can guarantee to make such a 
demonstration, but exploring that frontier is what is entailed in leadership.  
In the course of this century, mankind could get three times richer, or fifteen (try 3 percent 
income growth, and UN population projections, indicating population culminates in this 
century at plus 50%), so it is possible to afford mitigation costs even if they were feared to be 
five percent of world income. Choosing costly power could cost us one percent. If it can be 
done, it has to be shown that it can be one. That taking the lead is self-defeating by inducing 
free riding, is hard to imagine.  
An element of leadership not discussed here that could be important is rewards in terms of 
winning technologies and competitiveness. We shall not claim that this ‘Porter hypothesis’ is 
not important - it may be.  
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Our emphasis has been to point out that the present literature have failed to recognize that 
early action may be motivated by the leadership perspective: certain early acts are meaningful 
– productive – because others may follow, meaningful not because you’ll sell winning 
technologies to them, but because you instigate large reductions (even if uncertain, of course).   
In a time of weak or no global agreement, it may not be much deterrence to early action in the 
threat that others will respond with increased free riding. Importantly, early action should 
certainly not detract from efforts to form treaties. Finally; early, unilateral, unconditional 
action will be more than just cutting emissions at least cost. An appropriate question to a 
leader is: exactly what are you trying to prove?  
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